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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
Although it is a close question, I, too, am persuaded that 
the content of the phrase "non-violent offense," as used in 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13, should not be determined by reference 
to the definition of the phrase "crime of violence" in 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2. I also conclude that a downward 
departure is not authorized by S 5K2.13 in this case. 
However, I reach that conclusion by a route somewhat 
different from that followed by the court. 
 
Having concluded that the scope of the phrase "non- 
violent offense" in U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13 is not controlled by the 
scope of the phrase "crime of violence" in U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2, 
one must determine whether Askari's bank robbery offense 
constitutes a "non-violent offense" for the purposes of 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13. I conclude that it does not because a 
federal bank robbery conviction necessarily involves a 
finding that the offense involved actual force or a threat of 
force and such a finding, in my view, precludes 
characterization of the offense as a non-violent one for 
purposes of S 5K2.13.1 
 
The Poff dissent took note not only of S 5K2.13's 
requirement that the offense of conviction be "non-violent," 
but also of its requirement that the defendant's criminal 
history not indicate a need to protect the public. Read 
together, this dual requirement suggested to the dissenting 
judges that S 5K2.13 was intended to authorize leniency for 
those individuals who suffer from diminished mental 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I use the term "bank robbery" in the traditional sense. Traditional 
bank robbery is proscribed by the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a) 
which provides: 
 
       [w]hoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or 
       attempts to take, from the person or presence of another, or 
obtains 
       or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money or any 
       other thing of value belonging to, or in the case, custody, 
control, 
       management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any 
       savings and loan association. 
 
While it has been suggested that a public official may be able to commit 
bank robbery by "extorting" bank funds without a threat of violence, I 
would not regard this as traditional bank robbery and I would take no 
position on the application of S 5K2.13 in such a case. 
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capacity that contributed to their crimes so long as neither 
the history of the defendant nor the character of the crime 
indicated a need for incapacitation. Against this 
background, the Poff dissent ultimately concluded that a 
"non-violent offense" is "one in which mayhem did not 
occur" -- one that "in the event did not entail violence." 926 
F.2d at 594, 595. This conclusion suggests that leniency is 
available where the offense of conviction involved any sort 
of unrealized threat of violence so long as the defendant's 
criminal history does not indicate the need for 
incapacitation. 
 
The Chatman court similarly read S 5K2.13 as intended 
to authorize leniency for those whose diminished mental 
capacity contributed to their crimes so long as neither the 
crime nor the criminal history indicates a need for 
incapacitation. It rejected, however, the position of the Poff 
dissent that unrealized threats of violence cannot render an 
offense a violent one. In the view of the Chatman court, 
"[s]ome offenses that never result in physical violence may, 
nonetheless, indicate that a defendant is exceedingly 
dangerous, and should be incapacitated." 986 F.2d at 
1454. Thus, if the sentencing court determines that "an 
offense involved a real and serious threat of violence--such 
as an assault with a deadly weapon," it should conclude 
that it is not a "non-violent offense" for purposes of 
S 5K2.13. Id.. In the case before the Chatman court, the 
defendant had robbed a bank by handing a note to a teller 
demanding money and stating, "People will get hurt if I 
don't walk out of this bank." Id. at 1447. The case was 
remanded to the district court presumably for a 
determination of the defendant's state of mind. 
 
Chatman and the Poff dissent both take the view that the 
sentencing court should look to the underlying facts to 
determine whether the offense was non-violent. I agree, 
although I believe it may be helpful for a sentencing court 
to take note of the essential elements of the crime of 
conviction, not because those elements control the U.S.S.G. 
S 5K2.13 issue in all cases, but rather because the findings 
necessarily implicit in a conviction may preclude it from 
being a "non-violent offense" within the meaning of 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13.2 Moreover, I take a somewhat different 
view of the scope of the phrase "non-violent offense." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This is, of course, consistent with the obligation of a sentencing 
judge 
to accept for sentencing purposes the facts necessarily implicit in the 
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Askari was charged with bank robbery under the first 
paragraph of 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a). That offense consists of 
taking, or attempting to take, anything of value, by force 
and violence, by intimidation, or by extortion. As the court's 
opinion demonstrates, the requirement that the property be 
taken either "by force and violence" or "by intimidation" 
requires proof of force or threat of force as an element of 
the offense, and in determining whether intimidation is 
present, the question is whether an ordinary person in the 
victim's position reasonably could infer a threat of bodily 
harm from the defendant's acts. As the court also notes, 
the term "extortion" as used in 18 U.S.C.S 2113(a) means 
obtaining property from another person, without the other 
person's consent, induced by the wrongful use of actual or 
threatened force, violence, or fear. Thus, in every case in 
which the defendant is convicted of bank robbery under the 
first paragraph of S 2113(a), there will be a beyond a 
reasonable doubt finding that the defendant was violent or 
engaged in conduct reasonably perceived as involving a 
threat of violence. 
 
Under the view taken by the Poff dissent, afinding that 
the defendant's conduct was reasonably perceived as 
involving a threat of violence is not relevant to whether the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
jury's verdict. United States v. Boggi, 74 F.3d 470, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1996) 
("the district court . . . properly reasoned that `a guilty verdict, not 
set 
aside, binds the sentencing court to accept the facts necessarily implicit 
in the verdict.' ") (quoting from United States v. Weston, 960 F.2d 212, 
218 (1st Cir. 1992)). While this approach to U.S.S.C. S 5K2.13 produces 
the same result in a bank robbery case as that reached in Rosen, it is 
analytically distinct and will produce different results in other 
situations. 
Under this approach, "nonviolent offense" as used in U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13 
will (1) exclude from the scope of that section (i.e. exclude from 
consideration for a departure based on diminished capacity) offenses 
that would not be "crimes of violence" under U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2(1), as 
where force against the person of another or the threat thereof is not an 
essential element (e.g., transportation for purposes of prohibited sexual 
conduct), but such force or threat thereof is in fact used, and will (2) 
include in the scope of that section (i.e., include as candidates for such 
a departure) offenses that would be "crimes of violence" under U.S.S.G. 
S 4B1.2(1), as where the offense is burglary and no force against the 
person of another or threat thereof is employed. 
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offense is a "non-violent" one for purposes of S 5K2.13. Like 
the Chatman court, I reject that view. Section 5K2.13 
clearly evidences an intent that there be no downward 
departure on grounds of diminished mental capacity where 
incapacitation appears necessary to protect the public, and, 
in many instances, a threat of violence will be strong 
evidence of such a need. 
 
While it presents a closer issue, I also reject the Chatman 
court's view that whenever a S 5K2.13 motion is filed in a 
bank robbery case not involving actualized violence, the 
Sentencing Commission intended the sentencing court to 
determine whether the threat was a serious one that would 
have been acted on had events unfolded differently. Given 
that the issue turns on the Commission's intent, I look for 
guidance to the text of S 2B3.1, the "Robbery" Guideline, 
and the text of the criminal statute that guideline was 
intended to implement. Like most robbery statutes, the first 
paragraph of S 2113(a) does not distinguish between 
situations in which violence actually occurs and situations 
in which it is threatened but the threat is not realized.3 
Both are regarded as offenses of the same degree of 
seriousness. Similarly, S 2B3.1 does not distinguish 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Title 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a) provides for a maximum imprisonment of 20 
years. Title 18 U.S.C. S 2113(d) provides: 
 
       Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense 
       defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any 
       person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a 
       dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined under this title or 
       imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both. 
 
On its face, this can be read as punishing bank robbers who engage in 
actual violence--specifically, assault--during the commission of their 
crime more severely than those who only threaten violence. This is not 
the correct reading of S 2113(d), however. In Simpson v. United States, 
435 U.S. 6 (1978), the Supreme Court held that subsection (d) requires 
more than an assault and that " `the phrase `by the use of a dangerous 
weapon or device' must be read, regardless of punctuation, as modifying 
both the assault provision and the putting in jeopardy provision.' " Id. 
at 
13 n.6. Hence, the goal of S 2113(d) is not to punish more severely the 
actual use of violence in bank robberies under S 2113(a), but rather to 
punish more severely "the use of a dangerous weapon or device" in such 
situations. 18 U.S.C. S 2113(d). 
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between these two situations. It does not, for example, 
establish a base offense level for S 2113(a) offenses and 
then provide for a specific offense characteristic increase for 
those situations in which violence actually occurs.4 
 
It is my understanding that robberies involving violence 
and all robberies involving only threats of violence have 
traditionally been regarded as of equal seriousness because 
threats of violence necessarily hold an unacceptably high 
risk of realized violence whether emanating from the robber 
or from others attempting to respond to the threat. Because 
an unacceptably high risk of actualized violence and 
attendant injury exists without regard to whether the 
defendant expected to commit violence, our society has 
traditionally considered that factor to be irrelevant to the 
defendant's culpability in a robbery context. 
 
I agree with the view that the limitations on the 
downward departure authority conferred by S 5K2.13 are 
intended to preclude lenity only where no need for 
incapacitation is indicated. I do not agree, however, that 
where a person threatens violence in the course of robbing 
a bank as a result of diminished mental capacity, no need 
for incapacitation is indicated in the event the sentencing 
judge believes the threat was not a "serious" one (i.e., 
probably would not have been carried out had events 
unfolded differently). As I have noted, the bank robbery 
statute deals with situations in which there is a high risk 
of actualized violence and attendant injury without regard 
to the state of the defendant's mind. Moreover,S 5K2.13 
deals with situations in which diminished mental capacity 
has contributed to the commission of a crime. Thus, 
applying S 5K2.13 in a bank robbery context necessarily 
involves a crime with a high risk of actualized violence and 
a defendant with a diminished capacity to refrain from such 
high risk activity. That combination suggests to me a need 
for incapacitation and makes me reluctant to attribute to 
the Commission an intent to authorize S 5K2.13 downward 
departures in bank robbery cases. Because I find nothing 
in the Guidelines that compels such an attribution, I reject 
this portion of the Chatman court's decision. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1 does provide a specific offense characteristic 
increase 
when violence results in personal injury but not for violence per se. 
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I would hold that the scope of the phrase "non-violent 
offense" in U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13 is not controlled by the scope 
of the phrase "crime of violence" in U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2. I 
would nevertheless further hold that a S 5K2.13 downward 
departure is not authorized where the offense of conviction 
is bank robbery. 
 
Judge Sloviter joins this concurring opinion. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring with whom Lewis, Circuit 
Judge, joins. 
 
I agree with the majority's conclusion that the Sentencing 
Commission did not intend to import the "crime of violence" 
definition from the career offender provision of U.S.S.G. 
S 4B1.2 into U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13. I think the majority is 
correct in rejecting our prior holding in United States v. 
Rosen and the majority view in United States v. Poff in favor 
of the view espoused by Judge Easterbrook in his dissent in 
Poff. However, I write separately because the majority 
concludes that Askari's crime was not a "non-violent 
offense" based upon the elements of the crime. That is 
inconsistent with the approach taken by the dissent in Poff, 
and those jurisdictions that have followed Judge 
Easterbrook's reasoning. Rather than deny Askari a 
S 5K2.13 departure because of the elements of his crime, 
we should require an individualized inquiry into the 
specifics of his conduct to determine if his actual conduct 
amounts to a "non-violent offense" as that term is used in 
S 5K2.13, notwithstanding the elements of his crime. 
However, I nevertheless join in the judgment of my 
colleagues, because Askari's criminal history indicates that 
a departure under U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13 is not appropriate 
because of a need to protect the public. 
 
I. 
 
The majority properly rejects our prior holding in United 
States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1990). The majority's 
rejection of the reasoning of Rosen is grounded in Judge 
Easterbrook's dissent in United States v. Poff , 926 F.2d 588 
(7th Cir. 1991), as well as the holding in United States v. 
Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and United 
States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 1994). Maj. 
Op. at 17. However, the majority parts company with those 
cases insofar as those cases direct the sentencing court to 
engage in a fact-specific inquiry concerning the defendant's 
actual conduct, and the circumstances surrounding the 
offense, in order to determine if a particular offense is "non- 
violent" under S 5K2.13. Instead, the majority "take[s] a 
somewhat different view of the applicable standard." Maj. 
Op. at 21. It limits its inquiry here to the elements of the 
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crime of conviction and allows those elements to govern its 
determination of whether Askari committed a "non-violent 
offense" under S 5K2.13. 
 
The majority reasons, "[i]f the elements of the crime 
require a finding of violent conduct, then a valid conviction 
can hardly permit a sentence based on a finding of non- 
violent conduct." Maj. Op. at 26. After considering the 
elements of Askari's robbery charge, the majority concludes 
that robbery under 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a)1 is a crime of 
violence barring any consideration as a "non-violent crime" 
under S 5K2.13. Under this approach, once a sentencing 
court concludes that the elements of a crime include 
violence or intimidation, a defendant is no longer eligible for 
the fact-specific, case by case inquiry that would otherwise 
govern a departure for a "significantly reduced mental 
capacity" under S 5K2.13. Although the majority's approach 
does have a certain logic and symmetry that is quite 
appealing, I am not persuaded that the analysis under 
S 5K2.13 ought to be as limited as the majority concludes. 
 
The Sentencing Reform Act and the resulting Sentencing 
Guidelines have altered the relationship between the 
offense of conviction, and the criminal sanction that follows 
to the extent that the symmetry of the majority's analysis is 
no longer required or appropriate.2 As the majority correctly 
points out, the purposes of S 4B1.2 and S 5K2.13 are not 
the same. The factors that are relevant under S 4B1.2 are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a) provides, in part, that: 
 
       (a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or 
       attempts to take, from the person or presence of another, or 
obtains 
       or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money or any 
       other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, 
control, 
       management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any 
       savings and loan association. 
 
2. See United States v. Watts, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 633 (1997) 
(sentencing court may consider conduct of which the jury acquitted a 
defendant in imposing a sentence following a conviction); United States 
v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 243 (1997) 
(Guidelines allow a defendant to be sentenced based in part upon 
conduct contained in counts of an indictment that were dismissed 
pursuant to a plea bargain). 
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not necessarily relevant, or even appropriate, under 
S 5K2.13. My colleagues in the majority provide a very 
reasoned and convincing statement of why the definition of 
"crime of violence" cannot control whether a conviction is 
for a "non-violent offense" for purposes of a downward 
departure based upon "reduced mental capacity." However, 
the majority then restricts the meaning of "non-violent" 
offense under S 5K2.13 by the very definition that it holds 
does not apply under that Guideline. Section 4B1.2 defines 
"crime of violence" to include any offense that "has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force." However, today we adopt the reasoning of 
Judge Easterbrook's dissent in Poff, and the cases that 
have relied upon it. Under that rationale, a sentencing 
court should consider "all the facts and circumstances of a 
case in deciding whether a crime is a `non-violent offense' " 
under S 5K2.13. Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1453. Once we 
conclude that we erred in Rosen by restricting "non-violent 
offense" to the definition of "crime of violence," we need no 
longer tether our S 5K2.13 analysis to the definition in 
S 4B1.2 that we have just rejected. This point is best 
illustrated by Judge Easterbrook in his dissent in Poff: 
 
       As the Commission was at pains to establish in 
       S 4B1.2, whether a crime is one "of violence" depends 
       on its elements and not on the defendant's conduct, so 
       that an unrealized prospect of violence make the crime 
       one of violence. This is an abnormal sense, a term of 
       art. It took a detailed definition to make it so. Then 
       comes S 5K2.13, in which "non-violent offense" appears 
       without elaboration or cross-reference. Best to read 
       these words in their ordinary sense rather than as tied 
       to the term of art in S 4B1.2. A "non-violent offense" in 
       ordinary legal (and lay) understanding is one in which 
       mayhem did not occur. The prospect of violence (the 
       "heartland" of the offense, in the guidelines' argot) sets 
       the presumptive range; when things turn out better 
       than they might, departure is permissible. 
 
Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
One of the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act was to 
increase uniformity in sentencing by reducing disparities in 
sentencing. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, ch. 1, 
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pt. A, at A3 (U.S.S.G.). However, another important purpose 
was to increase proportionality in sentencing by imposing 
different sentences for crimes representing different levels 
of culpability. Id. To reconcile these seemingly contrary 
goals, the Commission, inter alia, provided for departures 
outside of the guideline range. See U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0. A 
policy that restricts departures based solely upon the 
elements of an offense is inconsistent with the 
Commission's attempt to apportion sanctions based upon 
culpability. Although we may properly conclude that one 
who commits a more serious crime is more culpable than 
one who commits a less serious one, that equation does not 
work where the more serious crime is committed by one 
who is less culpable because of a reduced mental capacity. 
"The criminal justice system long has meted out lower 
sentences to persons who, although not technically insane, 
are not in full command of their actions." Poff, 926 F.2d at 
594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Moreover, "[s]carce 
resources and prison space achieve greater deterrence 
when deployed against those who are most responsive to 
the legal system's threats and who pose the greatest danger 
if not deterred." Id. at 595. 
 
Thus, in Chatman, which the majority here cites with 
approval, see Maj. Op. at 19-20, the court held that a 
defendant was eligible for a downward departure under 
S 5K2.13 even though he (like Askari) came before the 
sentencing court convicted of bank robbery. There, the 
district court had opined that the defendant was ineligible 
for a S 5K2.13 departure because he had given a teller a 
threatening note during the bank robbery. The sentencing 
court concluded that the defendant's conduct therefore 
amounted to a crime of violence. Id. at 1447. The Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit relied upon Judge 
Easterbrook's dissent in Poff, and reversed. The court 
reasoned that S 5K2.13 vested a sentencing court with 
broad discretion to consider all the relevant facts 
concerning the offense because the Commission's purpose 
was "to treat with lenity those individuals whose`reduced 
mental capacity' contributed to [sic] commission of a 
crime." Id. at 1452. 
 
       In contrast to the purposes of section 4B1.2, the point 
       of section 5K2.13 is to treat with leniency those 
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       individuals whose reduced mental capacity contributed 
       to commission of a crime. Such lenity is appropriate in 
       part because, as Judge Easterbrook points out, two of 
       the primary rationales for punishing an individual by 
       incarceration -- desert and deterrence -- lose some of 
       their relevance when applied to those with reduced 
       mental capacity. . . . 
 
        . . . . 
 
        Considered in this context, the term "non-violent 
       offense" in section 5K2.13 refers to those offenses that, 
       in the act, reveal that a defendant is not dangerous, 
       and therefore need not be incapacitated for the period 
       of time the Guidelines would otherwise recommend. A 
       determination regarding the dangerousness of a 
       defendant, as manifested in the particular details of a 
       single crime that he or she has committed, is best 
       reached through a fact-specific investigation. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 
Likewise, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
United States v. Cantu was persuaded that a sentencing 
court's inquiry into a defendant's eligibility underS 5K2.13 
should be undertaken with a view toward lenity. 12 F.3d 
1506, 1510 (9th Cir. 1993)(citation omitted). There, the 
court agreed with the analysis in Chatman, and noted that 
"[l]enity is appropriate because the purpose of S 5K2.13 is 
to treat with some compassion those in whom a reduced 
mental capacity has contributed to the commission of a 
crime." Id. Although the court in Cantu was concerned with 
whether post-traumatic stress disorder could cause 
reduced mental capacity under the Guidelines not with 
whether the defendant committed a "non-violent offense," 
the court recognized that fact-specific inquiries must be 
undertaken to determine both the defendant's mental 
condition and the circumstances of the offense. See also, 
United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 547 (3d Cir. 1997) 
("Section 5K2.13 is intended to create lenity for those 
whose significantly reduced mental capacity cause them to 
commit the offense of conviction."). 
 
Thus, I conclude that Askari is not ineligible for a 
S 5K2.13 departure solely because of his robbery conviction. 
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The record shows that, although Askari had his hand 
underneath his shirt when he ordered the bank teller to 
give him money, two bank employees chased him from the 
bank. I submit, therefore, there is a genuine issue as to 
just how frightening or intimidating he was during the 
commission of the crime. However, I do not minimize the 
intimidation of the bank teller whom Askari confronted. See 
Maj. Op. at 27. Instead, the teller's reaction should be 
assessed along with all of the other evidence in concluding 
whether, based upon the totality of the circumstances, 
Askari committed a "non-violent offense" under S 5K2.13. A 
sentencing court should make that determination 
independently of the definition contained in S 4B1.2 (which, 
as noted above, includes the elements of the offense). 
Barring other considerations, a defendant's eligibility for a 
S 5K2.13 departure can be determined only after the 
completion of such an individualized inquiry. 
 
II. 
 
Despite my disagreement with the conclusion of the 
majority of my colleagues, I agree with the majority's 
ultimate decision to affirm the sentence because there are 
additional considerations under the departure provision. 
Section 5K2.13 is not only restricted to persons whose 
offense is non-violent, it also requires that "a defendant's 
criminal history does not indicate a need for incarceration 
to protect the public." See U.S.S.G.S 5K2.13. Here, the 
district court noted that Askari had a long history of crime, 
including violent crime. (App. at 56a.) Therefore, I agree 
that regardless of whether or not the bank robbery in this 
case is classified as a "non-violent offense," Askari is 
ineligible for the departure because his criminal history 
does suggest a need to protect the public. Thus, I concur in 
the judgment of the majority. 
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GARTH, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I agree that the order of the district court should be 
affirmed. However, I reach this result by relying on the logic 
and common sense of Judge Seitz's opinion for our court in 
United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1990), and its 
conclusion that the term "non-violent offense" cannot mean 
something other than the opposite of a "crime of violence." 
 
Rosen teaches that a defendant who has committed a 
"crime of violence" according to USSG S 4B1.2(a) is not 
eligible for a downward departure for commission of a "non- 
violent offense" with reduced mental capacity under USSG 
S 5K2.13. See id. at 791. Because Askari was convicted of 
a "crime of violence," namely bank robbery, he is obviously 
ineligible to receive the grant of a downward departure 
authorized by S 5K2.13 and the order of the district court 
imposing a sentence of 210 months in prison should be 
affirmed. 
 
The court today correctly affirms the order of the district 
court, but on its path to doing so, rejects Rosen. My 
colleagues take the position that the "crime of violence" 
definition of USSG S 4B1.2(a) should not be used to 
determine whether a defendant has committed a "non- 
violent offense" according USSG S 5K2.13. For essentially 
those reasons stated by the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, 
and Eleventh Circuits, I do not find this position 
persuasive. See United States v. Mayotte, 76 F.3d 887, 889 
(8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 591-93 
(7th Cir. 1991) (en banc); United States v. Russell, 917 F.2d 
512, 517 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Maddalena, 893 
F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Borrayo, 898 
F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. 
Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1454-55 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (D.H. 
Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 
In light of the many opinions on this issue already found 
in the Federal Reporter, I feel no need to rehash the 
familiar arguments in favor of Rosen.3 However, our court's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Briefly, however, the pro-Rosen arguments may be summarized as 
follows. First, common sense dictates that a "non-violent offense" is the 
converse of a "crime of violence." Second, the parallel structure of 
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inability to agree on a standard to replace Rosen provides 
a new perspective from which to appreciate its strength. 
 
Having agreed to reject Rosen's teaching that a "non- 
violent offense" is defined by S 4B1.2(a), my colleagues have 
diverged in their efforts to come up with a new definition. 
Reaching back to first principles of "modern criminology," 
the majority has promulgated a definition of "non-violent 
offense" that it believes will respond to "the need for the 
sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, 
to protect the public, and to provide just punishment." Maj. 
Op. at 23. Under the majority rule, 
 
       departures under USSG S 5K2.13 exclude conduct that 
       involves actual force, threat of force, or intimidation, 
       the latter two measured under a reasonable person 
       standard. Therefore, "non-violent offenses" under USSG 
       S 5K2.13 are those which do not involve a reasonable 
       perception that force against persons may be used in 
       committing the offense. 
 
Maj. Op. at 26 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the district 
court must examine "the elements of the crime and the 
surrounding conduct" to determine whether there was 
actual force or a reasonable perception of a threat of force. 
 
In their concurrences, Judge Stapleton and Judge McKee 
offer different approaches. Following conviction of a crime 
involving threats of violence that were not executed, Judge 
Stapleton would have the district court look to the 
underlying criminal statute and the relevant section of 
Chapter 2 of the Guidelines. If the district court could 
discern from these texts an intent to award lighter 
sentences to defendants who were unlikely to carry out 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
S 4B1.1 and S 5K2.13 suggests that the same definition should be used 
to assess whether the violent nature of a defendant's crime should 
support a modification of the defendant's sentence. Third, the Guidelines 
should be read as a whole, and when the same word appears in related 
sections, we should assume that the word carries the same meaning in 
both. Fourth, the term "crime of violence" is a broad phrase that appears 
in other sections of the Guidelines apart from S 4B1.1. See, e.g., USSG 
SS 2K2.1, 2K1.3, 4A1.1. Its meaning therefore can be exported to 
S 5K2.13 as well as to these other sections. 
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their threats of violence, Judge Stapleton would allow a 
defendant who appears unlikely to have carried out a threat 
of violence to be eligible for a downward departure under 
S 5K2.13. Judge McKee offers yet another approach to 
defining "non-violent offense." In his concurrence, Judge 
McKee advocates a totality of the circumstances test, in 
which a district court would be required to conduct an 
individualized inquiry into the specifics of the defendant's 
conduct to determine whether it constituted a "non-violent 
offense." 
 
As I see it, our court's inability to agree on a definition of 
"non-violent offense" in S 5K2.13 illustrates the wisdom of 
Rosen. By utilizing S 4B1.2(a), Rosen harnessed the 
Sentencing Commission's efforts to delineate the 
boundaries between violent and non-violent conduct. The 
Commission produced a clear rule. When linked to 
S 5K2.13 by Rosen, the result was simple and 
straightforward guidance that produced sensible results: 
defendants convicted of offenses involving the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 
a person, or whose behavior presented a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to others, were ineligible for a 
reduced sentence due to diminished capacity. By rejecting 
Rosen, our court has created the need to fashion a 
standard that at best can only replicate the efforts of the 
Commission codified at S 4B1.2(a). 
 
I do take some solace in the fact that the majority's new 
standard for evaluating departures appears to do just that. 
Indeed, it seems that the majority has gone out of its way 
to reject Rosen in theory but has embraced it in fact. 
Looking at the majority's new definition of "non-violent 
offense," I am hard pressed to think of a case in which the 
definition would produce a result different from Rosen: that 
is, when a defendant's action would not involve "actual 
force, threat of force, or intimidation, the latter two 
measured under a reasonable person standard," but 
nonetheless would qualify as a "crime of violence" according 
to USSG S 4B1.2(a). 
 
The court's attempt to conjure up such an example 
appears in part IIID of the majority's opinion. There, the 
court imagines extortion by a public official in violation of 
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the Hobbs Act. In order to come within the court's new 
standard, a public official with a diminished mental 
capacity not the result of voluntary intake of alcohol or 
drugs, acting under color of right, would have to extort 
funds in violation of the Hobbs Act in a way that did not 
involve a threat of force, as judged by a reasonable person. 
In such a case, the court hypothesizes, that official would 
be eligible for a S 5K2.13 departure under the court's new 
standard but not under Rosen. 
 
I have never heard of such a prosecution. Nor have I been 
able to locate any published reports of one. Indeed, as the 
dissent notes, it is not even clear that the majority's rule 
would produce a different result than Rosen given such a 
set of facts. See Dissenting Op. at n.2. Thus, it appears 
that the majority has rejected Rosen in theory but not in 
substance: it has fashioned from first principles a new rule 
that appears to mirror Rosen in every set of facts that has 
been known to arise. This being so, I see no reason to 
abandon our Rosen rule, with which five other circuits have 
agreed. 
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BECKER, Chief Circuit Judge, Dissenting. 
 
I join in Parts I, II, and IIIA, B, & C of the majority 
opinion, which overrule United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 
789 (3d Cir. 1990), and hold that Rosen's determination 
that "non-violent offense" as used in U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13 
should be controlled by the definition of "crime of violence" 
used elsewhere in the Sentencing Guidelines was incorrect. 
Judge Scirica's analysis in these segments of his opinion is 
not only sound but itself clearly demonstrates why the only 
appropriate and logical course is to permit the district 
courts to consider all the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the commission of a crime when deciding 
whether that crime qualifies as a non-violent offense under 
S 5K2.13. 
 
In Part IIID, however, the court holds that (and attempts 
to explain why) we should preclude sentencing judges from 
granting S 5K2.13 departures in "traditional" bank robbery 
cases.1 After invoking the Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 
S 3553, and exploring the terms of the bank robbery 
statute, 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a), the court defines "non-violent 
offense" as those offenses "which do not involve a 
reasonable perception that force against persons may be 
used in committing the offense." Op. at 26. The court also 
states that: 
 
       It would seem, therefore, that with bank robbery 
       convictions under the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. 
       S 2113(a), a defendant could not qualify for a departure 
       under USSG S 5K2.13 as presently written. . . . [i]f the 
       elements of the crime require a finding of violent 
       conduct, then a valid conviction could hardly permit a 
       sentence based on a finding of non-violent conduct. 
 
Id. at 29, 31. 
 
I do not believe that there any persuasive reasons to 
support the categorical exclusion from S 5K2.13 of offense 
conduct that the analysis in the first segments of Part III 
would have otherwise left to fact specific consideration by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I adopt Judge Stapleton's reference to "traditional" bank robbery as 
that conduct proscribed by the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a). 
See Concurr. Op. (Stapleton) at 30. 
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the sentencing judge. That is because, as those circuits 
that have already rejected the Rosen approach have 
concluded, the policies behind the departure provisions are 
distinct from (and often in tension with) the career offender 
and substantive offense guidelines, and that it accordingly 
does not make sense to assess whether an offense is "non- 
violent" based on the statutory elements of the crime. 
Unlike the majority, I would follow that logic to its 
conclusion. That logic, I note, is buttressed by Judge 
McKee's and Judge Garth's concurring opinions. 
 
I 
 
Section 5K2.13 of the Guidelines is a policy statement 
authorizing sentencing judges to downwardly depart in 
circumstances when the offender is found to have been 
"suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity not 
resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants." 
Section 5K2.13 is a guided departure, one that is thus 
"encouraged." See Koon v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 
2045 (1996). Although a S 5K2.13 departure depends upon 
a judgment as to the extent to which reduced mental 
capacity contributed to the commission of the offense, a 
departure is optional, and elements of discretion are plainly 
present. 
 
The critical limitation on the ability of the sentencing 
judge to grant a S 5K2.13 departure is that the defendant 
must have committed a "non-violent offense." This term is 
not, as the majority notes, defined anywhere in the 
Guidelines. In Rosen, we adopted a definition based on 
"crime of violence," a term of art used in S 4B1.1, the career 
offender provision, and defined in S 4B1.2. Unlike S 5K2.13, 
which permits sentencing judges to exercise leniency in 
appropriate circumstances, S 4B1.1 mandates that a certain 
class of recidivist offenders receive the harshest sentence 
possible under the circumstances by ratcheting up both the 
criminal history and base offense levels. 
 
A 
 
The effect of Rosen was that, by applying the "crime of 
violence" standard to the "non-violent offense" analysis, the 
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sentencing judge would be bound by the statutory elements 
of the offense in determining whether the crime was "non- 
violent." This is because a "crime of violence" is defined as 
an offense that "has an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another." U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2; see also United States v. Poff, 
926 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Easterbrook, 
J., dissenting) ("[W]hether a crime is one `of violence' 
depends on its elements and not on the defendant's 
conduct."). What actually happened is not relevant; the 
court need only look to the elements of the offense of 
conviction. Accordingly, since the crime of bank robbery is 
defined to include force or intimidation, see 18 U.S.C. 
S 2113(a), it could never be found to be a non-violent 
offense under the Rosen construction.2 
 
The majority rejects Rosen in favor of the contrary view 
expressed in United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th 
Cir. 1994), United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993), and in Judge Easterbrook's noted dissent in 
Poff. These cases demonstrate why we must necessarily 
examine the facts of the offense to determine whether 
"significantly reduced mental capacity" could be a ground 
for lenience at sentencing. As Judge Edwards summarized 
in Chatman: 
 
       [T]he point of section 5K2.13 is to treat with lenity 
       those individuals whose "reduced mental capacity" 
       contributed to the commission of a crime. Such lenity 
       is appropriate because, as Judge Easterbrook points 
       out, two of the primary rationales for punishing an 
       individual by incarceration -- desert and deterrence -- 
       lose some of their relevance when applied to those with 
       reduced mental capacity. As to desert, "[p]ersons who 
       find it difficult to control their conduct do not -- 
       considerations of dangerousness to one side -- deserve 
       as much punishment as those who act maliciously or 
       for gain." Poff, 926 F.2d at 595 (Easterbrook, J. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The majority concedes as much. See Op. at 9-10 ("If `non-violent' 
offense in USSG S 5K2.13 is defined by reference to the term `crime of 
violence' in USSG S 4B1.2 and its commentary, then bank robbery would 
never qualify as a `non-violent' offense."). 
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       dissenting). Further, "[b]ecause legal sanctions are less 
       effective with persons suffering from mental 
       abnormalities, a system of punishment based on 
       deterrence also curtails its sanction." Id. . . . 
 
       [W]hen an individual with "significantly reduced mental 
       capacity" does not pose a danger to the public, and 
       thus does not need to be incapacitated, that individual 
       is eligible for a downward departure. 
 
        Considered in this context, the term "non-violent 
       offense" in section 5K2.13 refers to those offenses that, 
       in the act, reveal that a defendant is not dangerous, 
       and therefore need not be incapacitated for the period 
       of time the Guidelines would otherwise recommend. 
       . . . A determination regarding the dangerousness of a 
       defendant, as manifested in the particular details of a 
       single crime that he or she has committed, is best 
       reached through a fact-specific investigation. 
 
Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1452 (internal citations omitted). The 
majority also recognizes this policy foundation,finding that 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13 "encourages more lenient treatment for 
persons who are not actually dangerous but whose reduced 
mental capacity contributed to the commission of a crime." 
See Op. at 21 (emphasis added). 
 
The policy rationale discussed in Chatman, in 
conjunction with the discretionary nature of S 5K2.13 
discussed supra, counsels that sentencing judges must be 
given the ability to examine the facts of the offense to 
determine whether a diminished capacity departure is 
appropriate. To that end, Weddle, Chatman, and the Poff 
dissent all reject the Rosen approach in favor of a fact- 
specific inquiry. See Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1452 ("We 
therefore believe that a District Court, when deciding 
whether a particular crime qualifies as a `non-violent 
offense,' should consider all the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the commission of the crime."); Weddle, 30 
F.3d at 540 (agreeing with the Chatman fact-specific 
approach); Poff, 926 F.2d at 595 (Easterbrook, J., 
dissenting) (concluding that "non-violent offense" refers to 
"crimes that in the event did not entail violence."). Thus, 
the essential distinction between Chatman and Rosen is 
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whether the statutory definition of the crime or the facts of 
the offense will be outcome determinative.3 
 
Yet, while the majority ostensibly rejects Rosen and 
claims to find the arguments in Chatman, Weddle, and the 
Poff dissent "convincing," see Op. at 20, it does not fully 
adopt the fact-based inquiry necessary to its own position. 
Instead, the majority posits that the district court should 
"look at" the facts of the offense, but should do so "within 
the context of the Sentencing Reform Act and the 
underlying statute defining criminal culpability." See id. at 
22. It then directs courts to "assess the seriousness of the 
offense" to determine whether a departure is warranted by 
looking "to the elements of the crime and the surrounding 
conduct." Id. at 23. And while the majority holds that "non- 
violent offense" should be defined based on the "reasonable 
perception that force against persons may be used" -- 
which sounds more like a fact specific inquiry-- it 
concludes that: 
 
       If the elements of the crime require a finding of violent 
       conduct, then a valid conviction could hardly permit a 
       sentence based on a finding of non-violent conduct. So 
       long as the bank robbery victim has been threatened 
       with harm, and is seen to have been threatened under 
       an objective standard (reasonable person), the 
       defendant cannot be found to have acted in a non- 
       violent manner. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. I note that the circuit split on the question presently before us has 
caught the attention of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which has 
recently proposed four alternative amendments toS 5K2.13. See 62 
Crim. L. Rep. 2051, 2078-79 (Jan. 21, 1998). Option one corresponds to 
the Rosen - Poff majority view. Option two corresponds to the Chatman 
fact-intensive view. Option three, a variation on the Chatman view, 
"defines the scope of the departure to exclude cases that involve actual 
violence or a serious threat of violence." Id. at 2078. Finally, option 
four 
broadens the scope of the departure by eliminating the "non-violent 
offense" limitation altogether. See id. It is interesting that the 
Commission, obviously influenced by the force of Judge Easterbrook's 
Poff dissent, which it explicitly references, appears to be in doubt over 
the best course to take. Unlike many of the other proposals for 
amendment it has made in the past, the Commission proposes four 
distinct options rather than taking a definite stance on this issue. 
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Id. at 26. 
 
Since the applicable provision of 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a) has 
as a statutory element actual or threatened force (the latter 
measured under an objective standard), by definition an 
offender convicted of traditional bank robbery could never 
be found to have committed a "non-violent" offense. Thus, 
under the majority's construction of Chatman, Muhammad 
Askari could not qualify for a departure under S 5K2.13 
regardless of the factual circumstances underlying his 
offense. To that end, the majority's proposed "reasonable 
perception" standard does not save its opinion from being 
analytically identical to Rosen. As Judge McKee explains in 
his concurring opinion, under the majority's reasoning 
"once a sentencing court concludes that the elements of a 
crime include violence or intimidation, a defendant is no 
longer eligible for the fact-specific, case by case inquiry that 
would otherwise govern a departure . . . under S 5K2.13." 
Concurr. Op. (McKee) at 37. In other words, in such a 
circumstance the majority directs us not to consider 
whether the facts of the case constitute a real expression or 
threat of violence, but whether the crime itself is "of 
violence." This restricts the meaning of "non-violent offense" 
by "the very definition [the majority] holds does not apply." 
See Concurr. Op. (McKee) at 38. 
 
I fail to see how this approach, which appears to credit 
Judge Easterbrook's reasoning, is substantially different 
from a straightforward application of Rosen or the majority 
view in Poff. As Judge Garth aptly opines in his concurring 
opinion, the majority has "gone out of its way to reject 
Rosen in theory but has embraced it in fact." See Concurr. 
Op. (Garth) at 44. I observe that the majority has properly 
rejected Rosen in theory, but has gone out of its way to 
embrace it in fact. 
 
B 
 
It is important that we pause and recognize the 
significance of what the majority holds today. As the 
majority correctly notes, one element of the applicable bank 
robbery statute is that the offender takes property either 
"by force and violence" or "by intimidation." See Op. at 12. 
 
                                51 
  
As discussed, it is this element of the offense that seals 
Muhammad Askari's fate. However, as the majority also 
notes, to prove "intimidation," the government need only 
show that an "ordinary person in the teller's position 
reasonably could infer a threat of bodily harm from the 
defendant's acts." Id. (citing United States v. Woodrup, 86 
F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 332 (1996). 
This means that a defendant whose diminished mental 
capacity at the time of the offense is beyond cavil could be 
precluded from a S 5K2.13 departure despite a record that 
clearly demonstrates that (a) there was no actual violence; 
(b) there was no real chance of violence being carried out; 
and (c) no one in the bank at the time of the robbery 
actually felt threatened by the defendant. This result 
cannot be consistent with the desert and deterrence 
rationales discussed supra and impliedly embraced by the 
majority.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The majority attempts in Part IIID of its opinion to suggest a set of 
circumstances in which an offender convicted of bank robbery still could 
qualify for a S 5K2.13 departure. In the majority's hypothetical, a public 
official could commit bank robbery by extortion in violation of the Hobbs 
Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1951(b)(2) without force or the threat of force. See Op. 
at 25-26. As Judge Garth suggests in his concurring opinion, this is a 
somewhat far-fetched set of facts, and is not particularly helpful in 
deciding whether the rule the majority fashions today is distinguishable 
from Rosen. I would also add that the majority's example, on its own 
facts, although styled as a "bank robbery" would appear to involve 
instead a prosecution under the Hobbs Act -- which does not have as a 
necessary element the use of force or the threat of force. See United 
States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 72 (3d Cir. 1972) (indicating that 
Hobbs Act violation can be based on fear of economic loss). In that case, 
the majority's hypothetical defendant could be eligible for a S 5K2.13 
departure even under Rosen. If, on the other hand, the majority's 
example would entail a prosecution under 18 U.S.C.S 2113(a), by the 
terms of the majority's own opinion a diminished capacity departure 
would be precluded. See Op. at 25 ("It would seem, therefore, that with 
bank robbery convictions under the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. 
S 2113(a) [including extortionate acts], a defendant could not qualify for 
a departure under USSG S 5K2.13 as presently written."). 
 
In order to distinguish itself from Rosen, the majority would need to 
generate a hypothetical under the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a) 
that would not foreclose a diminished capacity departure. This the 
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In contrast, to be consistent with its reasoning in Part 
IIIC, the majority should have modeled its result in Part 
IIID on Chatman. The facts of Chatman are just like those 
presently before us. The unarmed defendant walked into a 
bank, passed the teller a note demanding money, and 
threatened violence otherwise. The defendant left the bank 
without incident and was captured by the police soon 
thereafter. Since it was unclear from the record whether the 
district court had assessed the specific facts of the case and 
exercised its discretion to depart, or whether it had 
categorically rejected the S 5K2.13 departure based on the 
statutory definition of bank robbery, the D.C. Circuit 
remanded for a resentencing. See Chatman, 986 F.2d at 
1454. The same result should obtain here. As in Chatman, 
the district court rejected the S 5K2.13 departure not on the 
facts, but because it believed (correctly, as things have 
turned out) that it was precluded from departing based on 
the elements of the crime. But as Judge McKee states, once 
we have rejected Rosen, "we need no longer tether our 
S 5K2.13 analysis to the definition in S 4B1.2 that we have 
just rejected." Concurr. op. (McKee) at 38.5 
 
II 
 
Judge Stapleton, writing separately, also agrees that the 
definition of "non-violent offense" used in S 5K2.13 should 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
majority has not done. See also Concurr. Op. (Stapleton) at n.1 ("While 
it has been suggested that a public official may be able to commit bank 
robbery by "extorting" bank funds without a threat of violence, I would 
not regard this as traditional bank robbery and I would take no position 
on the application of S 5K2.13 in such a case."). 
 
5. Both the majority in Part IIIE and Judge McKee's concurrence 
conclude that we should also affirm the district court's denial of a 
departure pursuant to S 5K2.13 because Askari's criminal history 
suggests a need to protect the public. While it is true that to be 
eligible 
for a diminished capacity departure, S 5K2.13 requires that "a 
defendant's criminal history does not indicate a need for incarceration to 
protect the public," and while the district court found that Askari has a 
long history of crime, the district court did not expressly make a finding 
about the need for incarceration in this case. I believe that that 
determination should be made by the district court in the first instance. 
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not be controlled by the definition of "crime of violence" 
used in the career offender provision, S 4B1.1. However, like 
the majority, he concludes that a downward departure is 
not warranted in traditional bank robbery cases. Although 
Judge Stapleton's rationale differs somewhat from the 
majority's, I believe that it still comes up short. 
 
Judge Stapleton's reasoning can be summarized as 
follows. First, he rejects Judge Easterbrook's view that the 
findings of the jury at the guilt phase with respect to the 
defendant's use of violence or threats are essentially 
irrelevant at the departure phase. See Concurr. Op. 
(Stapleton) at 34. Judge Stapleton believes, like the 
majority, that if a conviction for bank robbery necessarily 
entails a jury finding that the defendant's conduct was, at 
least, reasonably perceived as involving a threat of violence, 
this finding should preclude characterization of the offense 
as "non-violent" for S 5K2.13 purposes. See id. at 30, 34. 
The difference between this view and Rosen, according to 
Judge Stapleton, is that while Rosen mandates that the 
elements of the offense control the outcome in all cases, 
under the Stapleton view the elements do not always 
control, but rather the "findings necessarily implicit in a 
conviction may preclude" characterization of the offense as 
"non-violent." See id. at 31. 
 
Accordingly, Judge Stapleton also rejects the Chatman 
view that whenever a S 5K2.13 motion is made in a bank 
robbery case involving unrealized violence, the sentencing 
court should have the opportunity to make an independent 
determination whether or not the threat "was a serious one 
that would have been acted on had events unfolded 
differently." See id. at 33.6  His rejection of the need for such 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Chatman court disagreed with the Poff dissent to the extent that 
Judge Easterbrook's opinion could be read to suggest that any crime 
that does not actually involve physical violence is a "non-violent 
offense." 
See Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1454. The court found instead that some 
offenses that did not actually result in violence may suggest that the 
defendant is "exceedingly dangerous" and needs to be incapacitated. See 
id. The court described such offenses as those which "involved a real and 
serious threat of violence," and included as an example assault with a 
deadly weapon. See id. This determination, however, was left to the 
district court. 
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factual findings is premised on a belief that the Sentencing 
Commission intended the Guidelines to follow the 
"traditional view" that crimes involving violence and crimes 
involving only threats of violence are regarded as being of 
equal seriousness. Based on an examination of the text of 
both the robbery guideline and the robbery statute, he finds 
no distinction between realized violence and unrealized 
threats. Accordingly, Judge Stapleton concludes that the 
Commission did not intend to authorize downward 
departures in traditional bank robbery cases involving only 
unrealized threats. See id. at 34. Hence, Judge Stapleton is 
of the view that an offense involving an unrealized threat 
could never be "non-violent." 
 
I disagree with this analysis for two reasons. First, I am 
not persuaded that Judge Stapleton's reliance on "the 
findings necessarily implicit in a conviction" is analytically 
distinguishable from the Rosen approach. The findings that 
are necessary to a conviction for a given offense will always 
be equivalent to the statutory elements of that offense -- 
that is, to say that implicit in a bank robbery conviction is 
a jury finding that there was a reasonable inference of a 
threat of bodily harm is no different from saying that the 
bank robbery statute requires the government to prove that 
the victims reasonably felt threatened. Thus, it makes no 
sense to me to hold that the sentencing court should"look 
to the underlying facts," see Concurr. Op. (Stapleton) at 31, 
while simultaneously holding that a departure could be 
precluded by "implicit" facts -- i.e. the elements of -- the 
conviction. I reiterate the point made by both Judges 
McKee and Garth that there is no difference between the 
Rosen "crime of violence" approach and an approach by 
which the decision to depart is per se precluded by the 
statutory elements of the offense. See Concurr. Op. (McKee) 
at 38; Concurr. op. (Garth) at 51-52. Judge Stapleton's first 
conclusion cannot be consistent with a rejection of Rosen. 
 
Second, Judge Stapleton's conclusion that the 
Commission has adopted the "traditional view" that threats 
and actual violence should be treated the same in the 
departure context is equally problematic. As the majority's 
analysis of Poff, Chatman, and Weddle amply indicates, a 
major reason why we have rejected the Rosen analysis is 
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that the policy goals driving the departure provisions are 
significantly different from the policy goals motivating the 
other portions of the Guidelines. See Op. at 18-19, 21; see 
also Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1452. Thus, while it may make 
good policy sense to treat bank robbery offenders who use 
violence the same as those who only threaten violence for 
purposes of computing the applicable base offense level, 
different policy goals are implicated when it comes to the 
departure decision, and in that context it does not 
necessarily make sense to treat empty threats and actual 
violence as per se the same. 
 
Furthermore, as Judge McKee explains in his concurring 
opinion, the "Sentencing Reform Act and the resulting 
Sentencing Guidelines have altered the relationship 
between the offense of conviction, and the criminal sanction 
that follows." Concurr. Op. (McKee) at 37. To use 
Guidelines vocabulary, the "heartland" of the offense sets 
the presumptive sanction range by way of the base offense 
level. In the bank robbery context, that heartland is defined 
by the mere prospect of violence. See Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Thus, the presumptive 
sanction is the same whether the offense involved actual 
violence or the threat of violence. Section 5K2.13, however, 
is concerned with whether the offense conduct is indicative 
of a need for the standard incapacitation entailed by a given 
offense or whether the conduct is more indicative of a 
mental illness, and thus society has a lesser need to 
incapacitate. See Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1452 (discussing 
incapacitation rationale). Thus, when "things turn out 
better than they might" and violence does not actually 
occur, a departure becomes permissible. Poff, 926 F.2d at 
594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). In that light, whether the 
offender was actually violent or posed a real threat of 
violence, or whether he presented a threat that was unlikely 
to have been realized, is a central and necessary factual 
distinction in the departure context. Thus, it does not 
necessarily follow that because the robbery offense 
guideline does not distinguish between realized and 
unrealized violence that the departure provisions should 
similarly not make such a distinction. 
 
Moreover, it is not even obvious that the robbery offense 
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guideline does not fully distinguish between "situations in 
which violence actually occurs and situations in which it is 
threatened but the threat is not realized." Concurr. Op. 
(Stapleton) at 33. Judge Stapleton is correct that S 2B3.1, 
the robbery offense guideline, does not provide for a specific 
base level enhancement for violence per se. However, 
S 2B3.1(b)(3) mandates a graduated offense level increase if 
the victim of the robbery sustained a bodily injury.7 I 
recognize that there can be crimes where violent conduct 
occurs but does not result in bodily injury, and thus this 
enhancement does not squarely refute Judge Stapleton's 
argument. See United States v. Harris, 44 F.3d 1206, 1218 
(3d Cir. 1995) (finding that there will be crimes where the 
offender will use mace but will not cause bodily injury to 
victims). At the same time, it seems plausible to read into 
this provision an intent of the Commission to treat serious 
threats the same as violence only when that violence does 
not result in injury. Since threats by themselves cannot 
cause bodily injuries, see United States v. Sawyer, 115 F.3d 
857, 859 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that psychological injury 
by itself cannot support an enhancement under 
S 2B3.1(b)(3)), the Commission clearly intended to treat 
legitimate threats and substantial violence differently. 
Perhaps, then, the Commission did not adopt Judge 
Stapleton's "traditional view" wholesale after all.8 
 
In sum, I would follow the principles advanced in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Section 2B3.1(b)(3) provides, in part: 
 
       If any victim sustained bodily injury, increase the offense level 
       according to the seriousness of the injury: 
 
       Degree of Bodily Injury                  Increase in Level 
       (A) Bodily Injury                        add 2 
       (B) Serious Bodily Injury                add 4 
       (C) Permanent or Life-Threatening Bodily 
       Injury                                   add 6 
 
8. Even accepting that the Commission did not intend to distinguish 
between violent offenses and offenses involving a real threat to violence 
in the departure context, that does not change the fact that the 
sentencing court needs to examine the offense conduct to determine if 
the threat was real enough to justify being treated like actual violence 
in 
the departure context. 
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Chatman, Weddle and the Poff dissent. Even if there is a 
reasonable perception of a threat by the bank teller that 
justifies a conviction and a base offense level that is the 
same as if the offender had used actual violence, the policy 
goals underlying Chapter Five of the Guidelines are 
different from the policies underlying the substantive 
offense provisions, and thus the jury's factual 
determinations should not necessarily preclude a 
departure. 
 
III 
 
The improvidence of the majority view is demonstrated by 
a recent highly publicized incident in the Philadelphia area. 
In December of 1997, in a drama resembling the one 
currently before us, the mayor of Darby Borough, 
Pennsylvania, a beloved and respected long-time member of 
the community, walked into a local bank in broad daylight 
and told a teller "This is a robbery. I have a bomb on me." 
See Lisa Sandberg, Darby Mayor Held in Bank Heist, 
Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 28, 1997, at B5. Apparently the 
mayor walked out with $1,500, but surrendered to 
authorities about one half-hour later. See id. According to 
the police investigating the crime, the mayor did not 
actually possess a bomb. See id. Friends and colleagues 
believe that his actions were the product of chronic 
depression related to personal and financial troubles. See 
Raphael Lewis & Lisa Sandberg, Depression Tied to Bank 
Robbery, Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 30, 1997, at B1, B6. 
 
If this were a federal case (it is not and will not be),9 a 
district court would have no grounds under the majority's 
opinion to depart downwards on grounds of diminished 
capacity. More specifically, it would have no grounds to 
depart even if it found beyond cavil that the defendant's 
actions were prompted by a deep psychological disturbance 
and that there was no real threat of violence. In my view 
that makes no sense. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. I am informed by the United States Attorney that the mayor is being 
prosecuted in state court, and that he will not be prosecuted in federal 
court. 
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For all the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. Judge 
Nygaard and Judge Roth join in this dissent. 
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